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Abstract: Is religion simply a part of culture? Can religious diversity be managed as a subset of intercultural 
diversity? This article explores int rcultural dialogue and its relationship to “religion’ in the policies, 
documents and debates of the European Community. The argument is advanced that religious realities 
and concerns are misconstrued when religion is subsumed into culture. Religion needs to be historically 
and conceptually rethought and that for cultural and religious diversities to be skillfully managed in the 
interests of social solidarity and positive intercommunal relations both need to be addressed di cretely 
and in tandem. 
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1  Introduction
In The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity and Islam, Douglas Murray’s new and widely reviewed 
book, the associate editor of The Spectator writes of Europe’s impending suicide, mainly due to cultural 
pessimism and the dramatic increase in the numbers of “unas imilating”, largely Muslim, migrants 
(Murray, 2017). The book is sensational, focussing on Muslim sexual violence and unsubstantiated claims 
about Muslim attitudes and behaviours, but much more significantly, the author has conflated religion 
and culture (and multiculturalism) and misreported and misunderstood the laws and policies on culture 
and religion in Europe. This article addresses these relationships in an exploration of religion and culture 
in the European Union (EU), and while co curring bout the importance of religious issues, this article 
argues for a disentanglement of the two as a necessary step in engaging with the real religious differences 
within and across the EU.1
The European Community is the unique and fascinati g dev lopment of an initially economic and 
now political union of nearly thirty nation-states (Berend, 2016; Blair, 2014; Gilbert, 2012; Jovanovic, 
2015; McCormick, 2014; Saurugger, 2014; Stivachtis, 2016).2 Concerns with integration in such a complex 
union raise issues of understanding beyond national narratives and borders and generate vital debates 
as to what constitutes sufficiently shared values and common ground to foster a stable European 
identity, alongside other sub-European identities – national, ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, class 
and spiritual (Bodiroga, 2016; Bonnar, 2014; Cerotic, 2011; Day, 2012; Dieter Fuchs, 2011; Feltin, 2007; 
Friedman, 2012; Gould, 2014; Green, 2015; Klonari, 2015; Keulman, 2014; Lucarelli, 2011; McMahon, 2013; 
Vogt, 2014). In the post-Rawlsian world, assumptions about “overlapping consensus” and shared political 
principles are much more difficult to assume or even to argue for. Polities appear to manifest massive 
1  An earlier version of this paper appeared in Mansouri (2017), 145-170.
2  There are few examples of former enemies creating successful economic and political unions.
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divisions and differences on almost every substantive matter of values, and common ground is less and 
less evident (Arts, 2004; Arts, 2014; Ghazaryan, 2014; McGhee, 2010; Rawls, 2005, 340; Rawls, 1987). The 
debate about identity and integration in the EU is illumined by looking at the European discourse on 
intercultural dialogue (ICD) as the principal contemporary vehicle for fostering integration by overcoming 
divisions, marginalisation and misunderstandings (Council of Europe, 1997; 2005a; 2007; 2008; 2015; 
European Commission, 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; De Kock, 2010; Wilk-Wos, 2010). Alongside this, there 
is another discourse about religion, both intersecting and running parallel with that on ICD (Council of 
the EU, 2013; Chaplin, 2016; Faltin, 2007; Kratochvíl, 2015; Leustean, 2013; Leustean, 2014; Nelsen, 2013; 
Wildmann, 2012). The role of religion in the EU both supports and challenges the potentialities of ICD. The 
examination and analysis of the relationship between these discourses provide an opportunity to explore 
contradictions and tensions between these two distinct literatures so as to suggest more effective ways of 
addressing issues of European integration and identity.
Born as a bold response to the crises of the two European-initiated world wars of the twentieth century 
and dramatically enlarged by the end of the Soviet system, the EU continues in seemingly perpetual crisis. 
It is beset with a torrent of refugees and migrants, challenges to the Schengen Agreement, an alarming 
growth in the popularity of anti-immigration right-wing parties, the financial vicissitudes of the eurozone 
and a rising crescendo of terrorist attacks. Brexit, the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership and its 
consequent decision to leave, has served to highlight fundamental EU concerns with its identity and 
integration (European, national and local), sovereignty and security (Adler-Nissen, 2014; Liddle, 2014; 
Zimmermann, 2016).
The argument in this article is that the EU commitment to ICD – an ICD that includes religion as an 
aspect, or dimension, of culture alongside ethnicity and language – paradoxically limits the EU and its 
participant states from responding adequately to issues that manifest themselves as discretely religious 
concerns. This, coupled with the poor and limited framing of religion, is evidenced in the recent example 
of the “burkini” in France. This modest body-covering swimwear, originally developed in Australia, and 
understood by some Muslims to be “Shariah compliant” is favoured by some Muslim women and others 
(Glassman, 2016; Liphshiz, 2016; Covertogs, 2016). The choice to don the burkini by Muslim women is 
widely reported as being religiously motivated. More than 25 mayors of southern French towns and cities 
issued bans on the burkini during the 2016 summer of Northern Hemisphere. Religion in the EU is governed 
by the European Convention on Human Rights (formally the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, European Convention on Human Rights, 2002).
Article 9: Freedom of thought, conscience and religion states that
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom 
to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2 Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public 
order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. (European Convention 
on Human Rights 1950).
Leaving aside two concerns that will be returned to in the conclusion (first, the priority of the external 
over the internal – thought and belief over practice and observance and second, that religion is understood 
to not have the capacity of making any discrete and unique contribution to the common good), article 9/1 
recognises the absolute freedom to observe one’s religion by choosing to wear the burkini as long as it 
does not negatively impact on democracy, public safety or order, health, or morals (Article 9/2). Thus, the 
mayoral bans were framed not as religious issues at all but in the unseemly and absurd terms of threats to 
public order, referencing the terrorist attacks in Nice and Paris, and, of course, none of the bans actually 
made explicit mention of the burkini at all. So, for example, the Nice ban focused on “correct dress, 
respectful of accepted customs and secularism, as well as rules of hygiene and of safety in public bathing 
areas” (Le Monde, 26 August 2016). The case was brought to the notice of the Conseil d’État, France’s 
highest administrative court, by the Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France (CCIF) and the Ligue des 
droits de l’Homme (LDH). The Court ruled unsurprisingly that the bans were “unlawful” as there were 
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no proven risks of disruption to public order or risks to “hygiene, decency or safety when swimming” (Le 
Monde, 26 August 2016).
The fallout included an intervention by the then Prime Minister Manuel Valls who was supportive of 
the bans, an attempt to make it an election issue by potential presidential candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, and 
it became a leading global news story, widely negatively reported. The failure of the mayoral bans, the 
Court’s decision, the public reporting and comment to substantively engage with the evident and obvious 
religious dimensions of the case, and the oblique interpretation of the issue as an example of incomplete 
cultural assimilation, and not a dangerous one at that, meant that little or no progress on the underlying 
religious concerns could possibly be made. This example brings into sharp relief European – in this case, 
French – difficulties in effectively and meaningfully engaging with or managing religious diversity.
2  The EU and ICD
ICD, first entertained by the institutions of the EU in the 1980s as a strategic path to greater cultural and 
political integration, has risen in importance due to a variety of factors, including the terrorist attacks 
of September 11 and the response to them; the expansion of the EU to include nation-states beyond 
Western and Central Europe; the academic and political challenges to multiculturalism; the 2005 UNESCO 
Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression and the increasing 
importance and centrality of ICD to UNESCO (for example, from 2002 UNESCO documents reference “ICD 
for peace”); the UN’s International Year for the Rapprochement of Cultures 2010 and 2011–2020 as the 
Decade of Interreligious Dialogue and Cooperation for Peace; the influx of migrants and refugees from the 
Middle East and Africa, particularly since 2011; and the ongoing threats and acts of terrorism, including 
from those who were born and who live in Europe.
For UNESCO, this “cultural turn” can be seen in its new Division of Cultural Policies and Intercultural 
Dialogue and reflected in the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (UNESCO, 2001; see also its 
precursors UNESCO, 1982; UNESCO, 1996; UNESCO, 1998). This declaration states that “culture is at the 
heart of contemporary debates about identity, social cohesion, and the development of a knowledge-
based economy” and links the promotion and protection of “cultural diversity” explicitly to “international 
peace and security” (UNESCO, 2001, 1-2). While the emphasis here is on the inherent value of cultural 
diversity based upon a universal human right to culture, there is a recognition that increased awareness 
of cultural diversity “creates the conditions for renewed dialogue among cultures and civilizations”. The 
following year, in the aftermath of 9/11, Koïchiro Matsuura, then Director General of UNESCO, spoke on the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity as “an opportunity for States to reaffirm their 
conviction that intercultural dialogue is the best guarantee of peace and to reject outright the theory of the 
inevitable clash of cultures and civilizations” (UNESCO, 2002, 1). The same document reiterates that ICD 
is the essential vehicle for sustainable development (UNESCO, 2002, 11). The central importance and the 
links between cultural diversity, ICD and development have undergone further development by UNESCO 
(UNESCO, 2001, 61; Sténou, 2007).
ICD is further highlighted in Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue (UNESCO, 
2009a). Here, the underlying reality of cultural diversity has “its corollary” in ICD, and it is through 
ICD that cultural diversity is protected and “effectively managed”. ICD is no longer an add-on or one 
approach among alternatives, but the basis of a “mutual understanding” that “permeates all UNESCO’s 
fields of competence” (UNESCO, 2009a, 2-3). ICD is necessarily dynamic, reflecting the changing nature, 
complexities and permeability of cultures that generate “multiple affiliations” rather than “exclusive and 
fixed identities” (UNESCO, 2009a, 45). ICD “is necessary as a permanent corrective to the diversity of our 
cultural allegiances” and the “only enduring response” to “mutual stereotyping” and the “unbridgeable 
differences” of “identity-based and racial tensions” (UNESCO, 2009a, 41-43). ICD has here become the 
“necessary” centre of the transitions to sustainable development, social integration and peace and 
reconciliation (UNESCO, 2009a, 49).
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A parallel “cultural turn” can be traced beginning with an increasing awareness in EU documents. 
Although the first and immediate referent of “culture” was to the national cultures of the EU, it was just as 
important to recognise that cultures were not exclusively bound to national or regional territories but, due 
to migration and history, were increasingly transnational and/or global, and of course, the intertwining 
of these elements generated the task of consciously developing a European culture. Alongside this was a 
growing recognition of the significance of the cultural dimensions of life – predispositions, rituals, myths, 
narratives, practices and languages – in terms of meaning, values and belonging. Culture also became 
evident in the antidiscrimination legislation that made it unlawful to discriminate on the grounds of 
culture, sex, gender, age, ethnicity, linguistic group and, of course, religion. This new sense of culture as 
identity and habitus alongside older understandings of culture and cultural production fed into the notion 
of ICD as the vehicle for the management of cultural diversity and the need to develop the “competencies” 
to support this. The incidence of September 11 intensified and securitised the case for enhancing ICD, as 
reflected in the European Ministers of Education’s 2003 declaration on intercultural education in the EU, 
which acknowledged both the diversity of Europe and the overarching value of democracy and expressed 
their confident hope that intercultural education could reduce social exclusion, racism and marginalisation 
across Europe (Council of Europe, 2003, 2).
The Opatija Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention highlights the role of ICD 
as an instrument for “conflict prevention” (Council of Europe, 2004, 1). Here, ICD is “to extend to every 
possible element of culture, without exception, whether these be cultural in the strict sense or have a 
political, economic, social, philosophical or religious dimension” (Council of Europe, 2003, 3). A further 
broadening of ICD can be seen in the Faro Declaration on the Council of Europe’s Strategy for Developing 
Intercultural Dialogue, which advocates that the development of ICD provides the foundations for “the 
political vision” of the Council of Europe, “both inside European societies and between Europe and the rest 
of the world” (Council of Europe, 2005b, 1). ICD is understood to be essential for “peace and international 
stability in the long term, including with respect to the threat of terrorism” (Council of Europe, 2005b, 3). 
Of particular significance is the transition to the new post-2008 ICD as the preeminent means “to manage 
cultural diversity” (Council of Europe, 2005b, 5).
The European Parliament’s explicit focus on ICD began in December 2006, leading to the European 
Commission announcing the European Strategy for Culture six months later, with its focus on awareness of 
“cultural diversity” and of shared “EU values”. The European Agenda for Culture in a Globalising World lists 
three dimensions to culture: ICD, culture as integral to foreign policy, and culture as vehicle for creativity, 
that is the “cultural economy” (European Union, 2007; Näss, 2009). The Council of Europe’s White Paper 
on ICD, Living Together as Equals in Dignity, followed in 2008, with the same year being designated as the 
European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, with its focus on cultural diversity, dialogue leading to enhanced 
mutual understanding and support for EU civic education promoting Europe-wide solidarity and social 
justice (European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008).
The Council of Europe’s White Paper contends that there is an urgent need for a new approach to the 
“management of cultural diversity”, a diversity now intensified by “history” and “globalisation”, with ICD 
as the principal mechanism and practice to address this within the context of its “increasing role to play 
in fostering European identity and citizenship” (Council of Europe, 2008, 17).3 ICD is defined as an “open 
and respectful exchange of views between individuals, groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious 
and linguistic backgrounds and heritage on the basis of mutual understanding and respect” (Haydari 
& Holmes, 2015, 177). The older approach is multiculturalism, understood here as the “coexistence of 
majorities and minorities with differentiated rights and responsibilities” stressing distinct ethnic, religious, 
cultural, programmatic assimilation and eradication or public effacement of significant and unacceptable 
differences. This approach has been rejected in favour of a more dynamic alternative, ICD, in the attempt to 
build a future including “European identity”, based on “shared fundamental values, respect for common 
heritage and cultural diversity as well as respect for the equal dignity of every individual” (Aman, 2012; 
Brie, 2013; Demenchonok, 2014; Dervin, Gajardo, & Lavanchy, 2011). The best strategic instrument for 
3  Of course, the same claim needs to be made about the potential contribution of religious identity to citizenship.
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overcoming existing, and preventing future, divisions is ICD, and this, it is contended, is utterly dependent 
upon the “democratic governance of cultural diversity”, the active promotion of intercultural competencies 
and the fostering of ICD both within the EU and at the international level.
The White Paper acknowledges a tension between ICD and the greater awareness and appreciation of 
diversity and the primary need for robust and sustainable European social cohesion (Council of Europe 
2008, 4).
Generally speaking, there is little consistency in the various EU formulations of the relationship 
between ICD and interreligious dialogue (IRD), so that, for example, both are equally but separately 
promoted in the Warsaw Declaration (Council of Europe, 2005a) as vehicles for fostering “European 
identity and unity, based on shared fundamental values, respect for our common heritage and cultural 
diversity”. Living Together as Equals in Dignity, Section 3.5, focuses on the religious dimension. There is 
a reaffirmation of a universal and non-negotiable “freedom of belief”, though there can be restrictions 
on manifestation of that belief “under defined conditions”, and that the Council of Europe enters into 
“open, transparent and regular dialogue” with religious organisations, while recognising that this must be 
underpinned by “universal values and principles”. It is stated that “Christianity, Judaism and Islam, with 
their inner range of interpretations, have deeply influenced our continent.” Although this is clearly true at 
some level, Christianity’s predominant role is not acknowledged, resulting in a misleading and distorted 
view of the past and present significance of religion in the individual and collective lives of Europeans.
Religious influences are further minimised by reporting that “Europe’s rich cultural heritage is a 
range of religious, as well as secular, conceptions of the purpose of life”, effectively giving equal weight 
to secular and religious conceptions. The plural is revealing in that it suggests both a religious diversity 
as well as a religious/secular diversity of the purposes of life. Religion here is also reductively framed as 
a resource for the “conceptions of the purpose of life”, a philosophical idea, or notion, rather than a way 
of life that is lived by individuals in communities. The notion of religion used here is abstract and difficult 
to locate in any identifiable religious “form of life”, although this gap between theoretical abstraction 
and ethnographic realities is perhaps just as evident in the discourse on ICD. The priority in Section 3.5, 
however, is to emphasise that there is an overlap between the interests of the EU on the one hand and 
religious communities on the other hand in the promotion of “human rights, democratic citizenship, 
values, peace, dialogue, education and solidarity” (Council of Europe, 2008, paragraph 72).
Furthermore, the CoE document contends that IRD has a contribution to make to ICD. The management 
of cultural diversity is simply deemed here to include religious diversity: “Religious practice is part of 
contemporary human life, and it therefore cannot and should not be outside the sphere of interest of public 
authorities, although the state must preserve its role as the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise 
of various religions, faiths and beliefs” (Council of Europe, 2008, paragraph 73). Religion is significant 
and as such in need of government regulation and management. However, the lack of understanding of 
the discrete and distinctive role of religion in European societies – even as a possibility – together with the 
reification of religion, the reduction of religious practice to cultural activity and religious belief to a broad 
category of beliefs, necessarily limits the analytical grasp of Europe’s religious past and present significance 
and therefore the capacity to effectively manage contemporary religions and religious diversity.
The very success of ICD in the EU is reflected in the raft of projects and activities promoting and 
engaging in ICD (Ecotec, 2009; Vidmar-Horvat, 2012). The clarity of the White Paper has perhaps been 
submerged in the plethora of ICD agendas, ranging from cultural heritage and museum ICD policy, 
diversifying the cultural arts and tackling discrimination and prejudice to explicit ICD components in 
settlement policies for refugees and migrants. Since 2008, the open method of coordination (OMC) has 
fostered cooperation between EU member states in the field of culture. There are fourteen OMC groups, 
one of which is ICD. Under the OMC, in the latest Work Plan for Culture 2015–2018 of the Platform for 
Intercultural Europe, four priorities are listed: (1) accessible and inclusive culture; (2) cultural heritage; 
(3) cultural and creative sectors: creative economy and innovation; and (4) promotion of cultural diversity 
and culture in EU’s external relations and mobility (Council of the European Union, 2014). The Council of 
the EU in 2015 reaffirmed the centrality and priority of ICD in the context of developing a “comprehensive 
strategy” to address “the migration and refugee crisis”. They acknowledged that “culture and the arts 
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have their role to play in the process of integrating refugees who will be granted asylum status as they can 
help them to better understand their new environment and its interaction with their own socio-cultural 
background, thus contributing to building a more cohesive and open society” (European Union, 2015, 
7). ICD is a means to “bring individuals and peoples together, increase their participation in cultural and 
societal life” (European Union, 2015, 4).
More recently, ICD has come to be framed as leading to “civic integration”, with ongoing ICD between 
co-existing cultures (Agustín, 2012; Barrett, 2013; Levrau & Loobuyck, 2013; Jackson, & Passarelli 2008; 
Jackson, 2013; Jesse, 2017). The balancing act between social cohesion and host-country values and 
respect for diversity is still evident, but ICD has a great value in starting with, and giving full recognition 
to, ongoing cultural diversities. ICD education and specific policies and programmes have had positive 
impact, creating new spaces for conflict prevention and resolution, and have made progress simply by 
fostering awareness of cultural diversity (Wiater, 2010; McMahon, 2013; Innocenti, 2015 Bergan, Harkavy, 
& van’t Land, 2013).
ICD aims at breaking the idea of established, majoritarian hosts helping newer citizens and residents to 
settle on the host’s often “generous” terms, in favour of the state acting as an impartial catalyst promoting 
ICD agendas and obligations for all citizens and communities. The parallel is the transition from the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals, where established nations were to help the less developed, to the 
UN’s Sustainable Developments Goals, where all states have obligations supporting the broader agenda 
(Sachs, 2012; Maurice, 2015; United Nations, 2015; Fukuda-Parr, 2016). The broader ICD agenda still 
appears to be somewhat assimilatory at the civic level while allowing new spaces for acceptable cultural 
expression (on acceptable and unacceptable “culture”, see the Conclusions section).
3  The EU and Public Religion
In spite of the crucial, and often not fully acknowledged, role played by the Christian Democratic Parties 
of Western Europe, together with Catholic intellectuals and activists, in the initial developments of first 
economic and then political arrangements for a single European polity, there has been little formal EU 
deliberation about religion (Mudrov, 2011; Mudrov, 2014; Grotsch, 2009). Former European Commission 
President Jacques Delors in a speech in 1990 is reported as having spoken of the need for a “soul for Europe” 
(une âme pour l’Europe) to ensure Europe’s very survival. Delors’ comment was glossed by the European 
Commission as “giving a spiritual and ethical dimension to the European Union” (see Hogebrink, 2015). 
He established links with European religious and other non-confessional organisations with the intention 
of having dialogue partners regarding values and spiritual concerns and to foster important civil society 
players to actively participate in the processes of developing a unified Europe.
The first official recognition at the EU level of religious and non-religious philosophical organizations 
was in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, Declaration 11, which acknowledged the existing relationships 
between member states and their “churches and religious associations” in state law and expressed respect 
for such organisations (European Union, 1997, 113). This reflected the very different relationships across the 
EU with established churches, state churches and different models and degrees of the separation of church 
and state. The Declaration 11 also granted equal recognition to non-confessional organisations, such as 
humanists, reflecting earlier formulations that insist on understanding religion not as an independent 
factor but as an alternative to humanism, rationalism and Freemasonry. As part of the EU’s work towards 
a constitutional treaty, from 2002 there were a series of consultations about the role of the churches and 
the place of Christianity in the EU, including a particular acrimonious debate over whether God and/or the 
centrality of Christianity should be directly referenced (Menendez, 2005). For example, in The Spiritual 
and Cultural Dimension of Europe. Reflection Group – Concluding Remarks (European Commission, 2005), 
the significance of religion is vouchsafed in the most insightful claim that “markets cannot produce a 
politically resilient solidarity” and the acknowledgement that religion might have an important role to 
play in this. Stress is also put upon the secular and religious elements of European heritage, again insisting 
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have their role to play in the process of integrating refugees who will be granted asylum status as they can 
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on paralleling the religious and the secular. It is equally clear, however, that these religious elements are 
not just “heritage”, as “only in the past”, but an integral part of contemporary European life as seen in the 
recognition that:
The presence of religion in the public sphere cannot be reduced to the public role of the churches or 
to the societal relevance of explicitly religious views. Religions have long been an inseparable component 
of the various cultures of Europe ... active “under the surface” of the political and state institutions; they 
also have an effect on society and individuals. The result is a new wealth of forms of religion entwined with 
cultural meanings (European Commission, 2005, 5).
This recognition of the fact that many European nations have national forms of Protestant or Orthodox 
Christianity, or Roman Catholicism, as integral features of the life of the nation is important not only in 
acknowledging the specific histories of member states but also in addressing the role of Christians in the 
formation of national identities and the ways this is challenged by secularists and adherents of minority 
and migrant faiths. The other side of the same coin is, of course, the embracing of secular ideologies as a 
weapon against minority faiths, as seen recently in Le Front National’s espousing of secularism in relation 
to Muslim dress codes. Religious symbols do have cultural, national and other identity meanings, raising 
concerns about the illegitimate and legitimate use of religious signs and symbols in public life. The report 
advocates that the EU should foster the “power of Europe’s religious faiths” and support and deploy this 
“on behalf of the cohesion of the new Europe” (European Commission, 2005). There are clear indications 
of the need to rethink state “laïcité” to allow for this greater public profile of religion, and there are sketchy 
deliberations about the “political relevance of Islam” in Europe and beyond (European Commission, 2005, 
7).
The 2004 draft European Constitution excluded God and Christianity from the treaty’s preamble and 
allowed only a more general reference to “religious heritage”, but the Treaty of Amsterdam, Declaration 
11, mentioned earlier, was included (Treaty, Art. 37). The debate continued after the failure to ratify the 
European Constitutional Treaty in 2005 with the President of the Commission meeting Christian, Jewish 
and Muslim religious leaders in 2005 and attending a colloquium in 2008 organised by the European 
Humanist Federation (EHF) and the Centre Action Laïque on Laïcité et droits de l’Homme.
The core EU document, the Treaty of Lisbon, was signed in 2009 (European Community, 2007; 
Schlesinger & Foret, 2006; Mudrov, 2016). The treaty’s preamble begins:
Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have 
developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, 
democracy, equality and the rule of law.
This serves to place the religious heritage of Europe alongside, and equal to, Europe’s cultural and 
humanist traditions as the foundations of the core value cluster, the “ultimate good” of the EU. “Religious” 
rather than “Christian” heritage further obscures the fact that Europe’s religious heritage is, in fact, 
overwhelmingly Christian. The understanding of heritage as that which is in the past is highlighted by 
the first two words. Religion is one inspirational source among others and has no singular or particular 
authority or perhaps contemporary presence (Leustean, 2012; Leustean & Madeley, 2013; McCrea, 2009; 
Mudrov, 2016). The sense is of religious, and other, actors initiating the process in the past that led to 
human rights and democracy in the EU; however, even this is unclear and vague.
Finally, in 2009, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 2007, effectively 
updating the 1957 Treaty of Rome) was adopted, including Article 17 (European Union, 2012). This section 
reaffirmed in law – based on the Treaty of Amsterdam, Declaration 11, 1997 – that the EU “respects and 
does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities 
in the Member States” (Article 17/1) and “respects the status under national law of philosophical and non-
confessional organisations” (Pollock, 2013). Furthermore, the TFEU provides a legal basis and framework 
for dialogue between the churches and other religious, philosophical and non-confessional organisations 
and formalises the existing dialogues with the Commission President, the European Parliament and the 
European Council. MEPs, many of whom have religious and other affiliations, which can impact on their 
decisions and voting behaviour, emphasise the problems of attempting to separate people from their values 
and convictions. All major religious groups in Europe now have full-time, permanent representatives in 
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Brussels or Strasbourg, as do various humanist and rationalist associations (Foret, 2015). There is thus a 
degree of recognition of the religious dimensions of the constitutional values and public morality in the 
life of the EU.
In 2006, the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education commissioned a briefing 
paper on ICD and IRD that reports the potentially negative consequences of intercultural agendas and 
debates that explicitly set up Christianity against minority religions, such as Islam and Judaism, or religion 
against secular norms. The report understands ICD as being the “wider frame” and it is within this that 
IRD should be located in order to reduce the polarisation of secular and religious groups. The paper rightly 
reports the broad church and religious support for ICD (Figel, 2007). Following an ombudsman’s report on 
the complaint about unwarranted religious privilege in the European Humanist Federation (EHF) in 2011, 
the Council of Foreign Affairs published guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion, 
or belief, in EU external relations. These include reference to the freedom from religion and the freedom to 
change religion and an explicit statement as to the secular neutrality of the European Parliament and, by 
implication, the EU itself.
The idea of secular neutrality is reaffirmed in the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the EU, a resolution 
adopted by the European Parliament in 2015, ostensibly to prevent discrimination against any religious or 
non-religious community and to guarantee equal treatment for all. This resolution also expresses concern 
that issues of religious insult and blasphemy laws could threaten freedom of speech in the EU. Although 
antisemitism, Islamophobia and all forms of fanaticism and attacks on religious buildings are condemned, 
it seems as if attacks on religion are in fact permitted while damage in the physical realm is vehemently 
denounced.
The context of religion in the EU is rapidly changing. The older impact of the French laïcité model is in 
decline but still evident in decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the domestic legislation 
and decisions of a number of member states. So, for example, some of the older secularist prejudice still 
appears evident, as in the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights when, in 2013, under 
auspices of the Council of Europe, decisions concerning British cases of the wearing of crosses at work, 
it ruled that wearing a cross is not “an essential manifestation” of Christianity and that a crucifix was 
a “health hazard”. This contrasts with the rulings in Lautsi v Italy (2011), where there was a wider and 
perhaps more sophisticated recognition that religion does have a role in European public life, in this case 
in regard to crucifixes in the classroom (ECHR, 2011; McGoldrick, 2011). The right to be free of religious 
coercion, that is, of having freedom from religion, as evidenced in secular state education, is giving way 
to the recognition of parental rights to choose their children’s education, including religious education 
(European Parliament resolution, 13 June 2013). The US model of self-regulated religious freedom 
nationally (internally) and pressure for increased religious freedom in international relations (externally) 
is in the process of being adapted and adopted in the EU (European Union, 2013). This has created the 
inconsistency that the EU (Lisbon Treaty, Article 17) allows European member states to determine their 
own relationships with their own state churches and religious institutions, but it does not afford the same 
right to states outside the EU and takes on the right to advocate for regulation and change of the content 
of religion in its external relationships. The Europeans still appear fixed on combining religion with other 
“beliefs” and thus refuse the recognition of even the possibility of a unique religious contribution to values 
and public life. The 2013 guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom or belief recommend that 
the phrase “religion or belief” always be used in full. They also, by distinguishing between people who 
hold beliefs and the beliefs themselves, permit and legitimate offence. Most recently, the debate about hate 
speech has been attempting to address this issue. The neutrality of the EU in matters of religious content 
is based on not being aligned to any specific religion (or belief). A final consequential addition in the 
guidelines is the need to balance religious rights with other fundamental human rights, such as “freedom 
of expression or equality”. This balancing of human rights is somewhat predetermined by the Council 
of Europe’s 2007 resolution that “states must require religious leaders to take an unambiguous stand in 
favour of the precedence of human rights, as set forth in the European Convention of Human Rights over 
any religious principle”. 
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The American model of “reasonable accommodation” (Rehabilitation Act, 1973), initially developed 
in terms of disabilities, was extended to religious diversity.4 This model of “reasonable accommodation” 
of religious diversity seems to be the most useful principle, particularly in relation to religious diversity 
in employment and education sites, and it is making steady inroads in the EU. In 2015, for example, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in its report, “Tackling intolerance and discrimination 
in Europe with a special focus on Christianity”, advocates reasonable accommodation especially in the 
workplace and education (Council of Europe, 2015). The EU already operates a “reasonable accommodation” 
framework for disabilities, and there are good reasons to support the development of this model as part 
of managing EU religious diversity. It is not necessary to follow the US in determining that reasonable 
accommodation should be the subject of the limitation of “fiscal neutrality to employers” or operated on 
the so-called free market principles.5 Europe is in no need of US-style culture wars. This new emphasis on 
the freedom of religion is increasingly separating ICD from religion. This has the advantages of addressing 
religious concerns independently, explicitly and directly but the very significant disadvantage of detaching 
religion from the management of cultural diversity with discussions and debates on the creation of policies 
on the management of religious diversity. The management of religious diversity should parallel the 
management of cultural diversity, in the need for education in religious diversity – religious literacy – 
and the development of competencies in religious diversities. Effective and responsible management of 
religious diversity is not interfaith dialogue, the dialogue between religions and the dialogue between 
religions and the state, nor is it the use of the courts and legislation to ensure religious rights. However, 
currently, both UNESCO and the EU subsume the management of religious diversity under the broader 
rubric of cultural diversity.6 ICD as the vehicle for the management of cultural diversity is predicated on 
the central role and responsibility of the state, or superstate, to maximise the freedom and opportunities 
of its citizens, including religious and spiritual, and to ensure that citizens have a life together with their 
differences. The management of religious diversity should likewise be a state/government responsibility 
in dialogue with religious communities and be supportive of social stability and society more generally.
The EU has not treated all religions equally and certainly is not neutral, in that it favours those that 
have a history of compromise with secular humanists and with the state. This ensures that other religions, 
particularly those of migrants to Europe from colonial contexts with their very different histories and 
theologies of political power and political theologies, are pressured prejudicially to adapt themselves to 
Christian European models of the role of religion in Europe.
4  Although the term “reasonable accommodation” was perhaps first found in Canadian labour law jurisprudence (O‘Malley, 
1985) referring to employers’ duty not to cause “that cause undue hardship”, it is in the US that reasonable accommodation 
has been focused specifically on the management of religious diversity. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
interpreted the 1964 Civil Right Act of 1964, Title VII, on non-discrimination on the grounds of religion as requiring 
“reasonable accommodation” on the part of employers to allow for religious differences. The caveat is that this extends only to 
accomodations that do not cause undue hardship or more than de minimis cost to the employer.
5  This US model of “freedom of religion” being promoted internationally by American and other scholars and advocates is 
often linked explicitly to the promotion of “free markets” and global free trade. The US State Department includes the Office 
of International Religious Freedom (OIRF), headed by the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, currently 
David N. Saperstein. The OIRF “has the mission of promoting religious freedom as a core objective of US foreign policy” (http://
www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/). In May 2016, the President of the European Commission announced the establishment of a new 
position, based on the US model, of special envoy for the promotion of religious belief outside the EU, and that Ján Figel, 
former EU Commissioner and Slovakian politician, was duly appointed. The European Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker stated that “freedom of religion is a principle inherent in the foundation of the EU”. 
6  How does UNESCO understand the relationship between ICD and interfaith dialogue? Although it is clear that interfaith 
dialogue has an essential role to play in fostering social cohesion and reconciliation between conflictual religious parties, 
this is understood as within “the wider context of furthering intercultural understanding” (UNESCO 2009a, 49). At times, 
the discourse of the UNESCO documents comes close to identifying religions as particular sources of conflict based on their 
misunderstanding of “culture” as exclusive, static, and fixed in stark opposition to ICD, both as approach and understanding 
of culture (UNESCO 2009a, Chapter 8, Religious mediation for social cohesion; UNESCO 2009, 7-9).
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4  Conclusions
ICD has made significant contributions to enhancing relations between different communities and to the 
“masterplan” for fostering Europe-wide solidarity and social cohesion. The tensions between different 
understandings of culture have led to ICD sometimes seemingly moving in contradictory directions. There 
are, at least, two different senses of “culture” in the EU documents on ICD. First, “national culture”, 
descriptively, in the sense of predispositions and characteristic beliefs and behaviours derived from shared 
experience, education and histories, particularly where there are significant overlaps of ethnicity, language 
and religion. Second, culture, again descriptively, in the more anthropological sense, as broad practices 
and behaviours associated with a locality, ethnicity or particular migrations. There is also a normative 
element that arises from the second cluster: the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable cultural 
practices or at least debates about where this line is to be drawn. My contention is that very often those 
practices and people deemed unacceptable rarely reflect anxieties about culture per se, but are more often 
reflecting specific concerns about religion.
The Hungarian, Slovakian and Polish debates about acceptable and unacceptable identities and 
practices of potential migrants are, in fact, directed against Muslim refugees and migrants.7 Muslim dress 
codes or manifestations of Islam are “unacceptable culture” in the public arena but are, in fact, about 
religion. The supposed malleability of culture misleads when dealing with religious issues, which so often 
prove to be resilient to pressures to change or external claims that these practices are not essential or 
significant. This distinction between acceptable and unacceptable practices is vital to promoting positive 
changes in the management of religious diversity in the EU. Rather than arid discussions of “common 
ground” or shared values reported as being held by more than one person or group, the discussion needs 
to be pursued at a different level. Religion/culture as food, festivities, folkways, fashion and fables are 
acceptable as reflected in their inclusion in pedagogical materials and also Eid al-Fitr, Diwali, or the 
Chinese New Year in European civic calendars. However, differences about the moral limits to freedom 
of expression and communal offence; polygamy; same-sex relationships; crime and punishment; a good 
society and a meaningful life; ways of behaving that create social cohesion in particular communal settings; 
the origins of human rights, morals and ethics; and social, communal and individual responsibilities are 
all, in the anthropological sense, cultural too. However, these issues are clearly analytically different and 
need thinking about and managing differently. These differences are perhaps more appropriately labelled 
as “religious”, and while it is true that differences rather than banal commonalities are easier forms of 
cultural diversity to manage, the airing of profound religious differences can foster prejudice, chauvinism, 
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what can be accommodated while maintaining dignity for all those concerned. Just as corporate directors 
and those involved in governance are asked to contemplate their “risk for appetite”, so those involved with 
religious governance might consider their “appetite for acceptable religious difference”. (Hassani, 2015).
To say that a European is a Protestant does not mean that he or she necessarily subscribes to a theory 
of consubstantiation rather than transubstantiation or adheres to a particular model of ecclesiastical 
leadership. Likewise, being a European Muslim does not necessarily entail expertise on specific legal 
interpretations of a practice. Rather, it means that he or she was formed in, knows how to live within 
a particular religious community that distinguishes itself from other communities and is aware of the 
dynamic debates and discussions within the community over matters of consequence. Religion is not belief 
alongside other ethical beliefs that logically gives rise to particular behaviours, but beliefs and behaviours 
that arise and are manifest in tandem. Religious practice is epistemologically a way of knowing not a 
secondary and subsequent feature of religious belief. This European legacy of philosophical dualism that 
disembodies and privatises religious freedom and structures and manages the physical, while distorting 
Christianity alongside other religious traditions, does reflect the Protestant priority on personal belief, 
7  The 2015 Slovakian proposal to accept only Christian and reject Muslim refugees and migrants was condemned by the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The Slovakian argument was that only Christian migrants could possibly settle 
and be part of a Christianity solidarity.
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providing the basis for individual and communal religious life. There are newer and more applicable 
philosophical alternatives. Other religious traditions are not so easily rendered as a list of fundamental 
beliefs that in turn generate individual and communal religious practice.
In the case of S. A. S. v. France, held in the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights in 2013 and 2014, the Court ruled that the French ban on face covering did not violate European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provisions on the right to privacy (Art. 8), freedom of religion (Art. 
9), inhuman or degrading treatment (Art. 3), freedom of expression (Art. 10), freedom of assembly (Art. 
11) and discrimination (Art. 14) (European Court of Human Rights, 2014). The judges, however, decided 
by a majority of fifteen to two that the French state did have the right to ban the burqa or niqab, which 
is used for covering the face in public places (Law #2010-1192, 2010). The French state argued that under 
Article 9/2, the limitations on religious freedom were “necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others”. The Court found this convincing, and the ban was upheld as a necessity to ensure 
“le vivre ensemble”, so that people could live together. This seems unreasonable and unaccommodating, 
and the public safety angle is unconvincing. Who exactly is living together with who? The development 
of a model for the management of religious diversity, intersecting and overlapping with ICD models of 
managing cultural diversity, focussed on religious literacy and competencies, incorporating reasonable 
accommodation, within a dynamic framework of democratic human rights would open a new era for 
religion in the EU and directly address the barriers to le vivre ensemble in terms of Europe’s changing 
social realities and ideals.
In summary, religious diversity is a European social fact; in fact, we could refer to this growing 
religious diversity as a hyper religious diversity of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism, Buddhism, 
Hinduism and secularism where major religious traditions intersect with established host cultures and 
waves of immigration, with near infinite varieties of commitment, practice and identifications. The EU has 
only just begun to engage with this increasingly complex social reality. As yet laïcité and existing legal and 
political structures promoting forms of assimilationist integration are proving to be inadequate as means 
of managing this new religious diversity. This new diversity requires a new model for its management 
that opens up creative opportunities for living together with our differences rather than a closing down 
of the same. The EU has a crucial and central governance role to play in this. The dynamic and changing 
religious diversity in Europe guarantees that there will be further religious tensions over religious practices 
and values; the important issue is not the elimination of such conflicts but developing a framework and 
policies to openly and peacefully manage them. New narratives and collective practices (civil religion?) are 
needed that embrace the past and allow inclusive futures to be framed.
The whole issue of possible Turkish membership generated in the EU calls for a recognition of the 
foundational and ongoing Christian character of Europe. This is an invitation for dialogue not its closure 
(Hurd, 2006). There is a need to have a more sophisticated and less dualistic account of religion that 
recognises the subtle interplay between beliefs and practices. There is also a need to be open to the particular 
contribution that religion has played, and can play, in fostering solidarity and social cohesion alongside its 
unique spiritual contributions to creating meaningful and purposeful lives (Nelsen & Guth, 2015, chapter 
10). Separating ICD from religion is helpful as long as the benefits of ICD are not compromised or lost, in 
particular, the model of explicit state and civic society responsibilities for the management of diversity.
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